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Basedau/Stroh: Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries tion, and it seems reasonable to argue that more institutionalized parties perform more favorably as regards their functional duties than less institutionalized parties do.
In theoretical terms, the huge body of literature highlights the importance of institutionalization of parties and party systems for democratic consolidation (e.g., Diamond 1988; Merkel 1996; Mainwaring 1998) . However, Randall and Svåsand have pointed to an at least threefold challenge as regards the precision of the concept in the existing literature (Randall and Svåsand 2002) . These three aspects refer to the distinction between parties and party systems, the gap between theory and operationalization, and finally, an inadequate use of data.
First, very few of the studies which deal with institutionalization distinguish between single parties and the party system. Indeed, the features of its individual constituting elements contribute significantly to the features of the system and the relation between party institutionalization and democracy is only established through the party system. However, a system includes the relations between its elements and, hence, is more than the sum of its elements (e.g., Basedau 2007: 108 ; for a contrary view see Schedler 1995) . In any case, single parties and the party system remain different phenomena and it is important to analyze them separately. One would not evaluate individual companies with the same analytical instruments as the overall economic system. Second, theoretical approaches on the one hand (most often building on Selznick and Broom 1955 and Huntington 1968) and empirical operationalization on the other remain poorly integrated, which often leads to an undercomplex measurement of institutionalization. Finally, there is a lack of combination of quantitative and qualitative data. Relevant studies tend to concentrate on a single method rather than combining more than one. The contribution of Randall and Svåsand is an exception to the first, and in some respects also to the second and third, of the challenges mentioned above. However, they do not put their own concept to the test and, therefore, avoid the difficulties that arise from the practical application of a sophisticated concept of party institutionalization to real cases (Randall and Svåsand 2002) .
This article attempts to fill the gap by developing an instrument that measures party institutionalization empirically but on the basis of universal categories and a pronounced theoretical concept. The paper proceeds as follows: Using Randall and Svåsand as a starting point, it provides a brief review of the concept of institutionalization and, more precisely, party institutionalization, leading to a concise definition of party institutionalization. We then use this definition as we proceed to the construction of an Index of the Institutionalization of Parties (IIP) which permits assessment of the degree of institutionalization of any party worldwide.
We subsequently try to demonstrate the usefulness of the index by exploring data on 28 political parties in nine Anglophone 2 and Francophone countries in Africa for which sound 2 We are very grateful to Gero Erdmann, who heads the GIGA project on Anglophone Africa and who provided great support as to the data concerning several Anglophone parties included in our empirical set. A preliminary version of the empirical part of the paper, which excluded Francophone Africa, has been published by Basedau, Stroh, and Erdmann (Basedau et al. 2006) . The concept and measurement has been significantly refined since then. 7 quantitative and qualitative data on political parties is available. 3 Investigating the differences and similarities of African parties is of particular interest for at least two interrelated reasons. Parties in Africa-as well as in most new democracies and democratizing countries in developing areas-are said to be uniformly poorly institutionalized (Erdmann 1999 , Erdmann 2004 , but this assertion has remained fairly undifferentiated and, above all, poorly supported empirically (see also Basedau 2007: 121-3, 132) . After presenting and discussing the empirical results, the paper closes by summarizing the findings and discussing perspectives for future research.
What Institutionalization Is and How to Measure It
What is institutionalization? And what is party institutionalization? While it is still true that there is no universally recognized definition of institutions or of institutionalization (cf. Merkel 1996) , the terms continue to enjoy great popularity in the social sciences. Generally, we can distinguish between a wider and a narrower understanding of institutions. The more restricted term refers to North's economic definition, which has greatly influenced political science. According to North, "Institutions are the rules of the game and organizations are the players" (North 1993: 12) . A wider definition that is influenced by sociology allows for the subsumption of particular organizations under the concept of institutions. Most definitely, parties are organizations that shall develop into institutions through institutionalization. That is why we resort to the sociological approach. In dealing with parties and party systems, most of the literature cites Huntington's definition: "Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington 1968: 12) . In an earlier publication, Selznick and Broom underlined the aspect of value, using the term "value-infusion" (Selznick and Broom 1955, see also Levitsky 1998) . Indeed, even if one emphasizes stability (cf. e.g. Panebianco 1988 : 49-68, Lindberg 2007 , the term "institutionalization" is only gaining its added value vis-à-vis pure "stability" if we add the value aspect. However, while we might be able to measure stability through quantitative means, measuring value-infusion is more difficult due to the lack of adequate and valid quantitative data. In most cases, we may require qualitative assessment based on in-depth knowledge of the individual cases.
If we accept that institutionalization is characterized by stability and value-infusion, how, then, can we define party institutionalization? Huntington, Janda, Kuenzi, and Lambright as well as others largely circumvent the qualitative aspect of institutionalization (Huntington 1968 , Janda 1980 , Kuenzi and Lambright 2001 -that is, value-infusion-and confine their analysis to stability. Only Janda explicitly acknowledges the difference between parties and 3 The data was collected by two research projects carried out by the GIGA Institute of African Affairs and funded by the German Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG).
party systems. Above all, parties are organizations and thus cannot provide all the benefits the system is supposed to deliver. 4 Consequently, party institutionalization is a process in which individual political parties that participate in elections experience an increase in organizational stability and value. 5 Value-infusion means that a relevant share of peopleparty members and the electorate-sees the party as an organization one should not do without. This comes close to the conceptualization developed by Randall and Svåsand, who have provided the most sophisticated theoretical discussion of what party institutionalization is (Randall and Svåsand 2002) . However, their model also includes another important distinction which was already noted by Panebianco: the distinction between an external and an internal dimension of the process (see also Basedau 2007 ). An institutionalized party is externally autonomous and possesses a certain level of "systemness" internally (Panebianco 1988: 55-57) ; that is, it is largely independent from other organizations and provides for functional working structures.
As regards the general principles for measuring party institutionalization, we can point to three main theoretical insights. First, we need to measure party institutionalization separately from the institutionalization of party systems. Second, the institutionalization of parties, that is, organizations, is basically about increasing stability and value-infusion. Finally, organizations have to institutionalize with respect to their internal and external relations.
Keeping these requirements in mind, we have examined the rich literature on measuring institutionalization. Only in a few cases is the focus on single parties (Janda 1980 , Panebianco 1988 : 49-68, Dix 1992 , Randall and Svåsand 2002 . While several studies referring to party systems also collect data on individual organizations, they are usually satisfied with aggregated quantitative data (cf. e.g., Mainwaring and Scully 1995 , Bendel and Grotz 2001 , Kuenzi and Lambright 2001 . The quantitative bias is not confined to studies on party systems. For example, Janda's large-N comparison sacrifices much of its conceptual strength to the needs of data coverage and mathematical handling. In particular, the value-infusion aspect of institutionalization is almost completely absent in all of these studies.
In addition to the two aspects of stability and value-infusion, there are five general criteria or dimensions that reappear regularly, though in varying composition and never all together. All the studies claiming to measure single parties and some studies at the system level mention the "level of organization" (Mainwaring 1998 , Basedau 2007 , Bendel and Grotz 2001 cf. "complexity" in Huntington 1968 and Dix 1992) as one criterion. Certainly, 4 However, they are organizations that can institutionalize in the sense of the general sociological definition of "institutionalization". Our term "party institutionalization" will be used to avoid conceptual confusion.
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Two caveats are due in this respect: First, the qualification as a process actually demands time series measurement which we cannot deliver for our African cases due to a lack of data. Therefore, the following first application of our index is restricted to measurement of the degree of institutionalization in one particular (recent) moment. Second, as Schedler rightly argued, parties can be overinstitutionalized (Schedler 1995 : 2-4, Kesselman 1970 ). However, our index reveals high levels of institutionalization in a functional manner. Top results should be controlled afterwards. The IIP aims to reveal differences beneath a certain degree of overinstitutionalization since this is more relevant to most non-European areas. 9 their operationalization of this dimension varies, but this is a question we shall leave until later. Internal "coherence" is the second criterion included by most of the authors. As with the aforementioned "level of organization," there are a large variety of suggestions as to how to operationalize coherence (Mainwaring 1998 , Kuenzi and Lambright 2001 , Basedau 2007 , Dix 1992 , while some authors do without any operationalization (Huntington 1968) .
Two further dimensions are adequately connected with the concept of institutionalization.
These are "autonomy" from too much external influence (mainly Huntington 1968 , Dix 1992 , Randall and Svåsand 2002  with regard to independence from the state, Bendel and Grotz 2001) and "roots in society." The latter indicates strong ties between the organization and the society it acts in (see Mainwaring 1998 , Kuenzi and Lambright 2001 , Randall and Svåsand 2002 , Basedau 2007 cf. "adaptability" in Huntington 1968 and Dix 1992) . However, both dimensions have to be balanced since they are interconnected and cannot be maximized simultaneously: Very strong ties may indicate dependence, which necessarily reduces autonomy. In the final instance, we need a minimum of both for functional institutionalization. A fifth dimension is modes of competition (see Mainwaring 1998, Kuenzi and Lambright 2001) , which is excluded from our model because a minimum of competition is an unequivocal feature of a multiparty system. In fact, it seems generally questionable whether or not institutionalization includes competition at all. 6
To sum up, Randall and Svåsand come closest to our own concept of party institutionalization. They distinguish between organizations and systems as well as between their external and internal dimensions, but they remain somewhat fuzzy when it comes to the qualitative aspects of their conceptualization. They establish four dimensions of party institutionalization and rely on internal vs. external as well as structural vs. attitudinal aspects (see Randall and Svåsand 2002: 9-15) . When they speak of attitudinal criteria, they actually refer to aspects of value-infusion, a term they already use to describe the internal attitudinal dimension, though "reification," which is their term for the external attitudinal dimension, is part of the same realm. Hence, we modify the four-dimensional model of Randall and Svåsand, referring to the original terms in the definition of institutionalization (see Table 1 ). We place "roots in society" in the external stability dimension and party organization in the dimension of internal stability. "Autonomy" and "coherence" are assigned to the dimensions of external and internal value-infusion respectively. In the following section we will present how we practically measure these abstract dimensions. For this exercise it may be useful to specify our concept of measurement beforehand.
Careful theoretical reasoning will certainly result in consistency between the aforementioned criteria and the more abstract theoretical concept.
However, the allocation of our four criteria to the dimensions of the model varies in terms of its degree of self-explanation. Most evidently, roots in society stabilize an organization externally. Furthermore, it can be convincingly argued that party organization is a precondition for stability. This being the case, more institutionalized parties should show a higher degree of organization which is empirically measurable and, therefore, an adequate criterion for the dimension of internal stability. Concerning value-infusion, we are obliged to measure indirectly because of the highly abstract character of the item. Therefore, it is very difficult to differentiate between preconditions, defining elements, and immediate consequences. It can be argued that a certain degree of autonomy-our criterion for external value-infusion-is either an immediate consequence of or a precondition for institutionalization. We argue that external actors who highly value an organization's existence sanction and safeguard its autonomy from arbitrary control. Coherent behavior on the part of party officials, in the sense of loyalty towards the organization they act for, signifies that they value it in terms of abstract existence. This is particularly pertinent in situations where officials subordinate private interests for the sake of the party's performance.
Additionally, it should be noted that there may be interrelations between dimensional aspects and criteria. Panebianco has suggested that external and internal institutionalization support one another. We have already mentioned the concurrence between societal ties and autonomy. Furthermore, we assume that the higher the value of an organization, the more stable it is. On the other hand, a certain level of organization might be a precondition for all of the other criteria, as it provides for visibility of an impersonal actor.
All these possibly theoretically relevant connections, however, must be set aside if we want first and foremost to offer an adequate and broad-based index for party institutionalization.
At this stage the primary goal is to measure those characteristics which we believe indicate institutionalized parties, independently from their actual functional performance.
Constructing an Index of the Institutionalization of Parties (IIP)
As in other areas of research, the study of party institutionalization has been characterized by a certain juxtaposition of theoretically oriented and empirically oriented research. While theorists concentrate on the validity of concepts and may not bother to think about operationalization, empirically oriented scholars often use data and indicators which are readily available but all too often not really related to the concept in question.
Related to this is a second observation: There is certainly no lack of ideas about how to measure different characteristics of party institutionalization (see previous section and Mainwaring 1998; Basedau 2007) . However, the data in question is often not available or is difficult to obtain. As a consequence, some aspects of party institutionalization are systematically neglected in empirical research: While we have little difficulty capturing objective quantitative data on party ages or changes in electoral support (volatility), even for large numbers of parties, subjective quantitative data such as party identification or trust in parties require costly survey polls. Information on features such as organizational strength or coherence will sometimes be impossible to obtain without in-depth field research. This may also explain why most empirical studies on party institutionalization measure party systems and not individual political parties. In other cases, measures which necessarily apply to the system level are used for the individual level, or simply fail to distinguish between both levels-as already pointed out in the previous section.
Finally, we observe in the more sophisticated measurements (Dix 1992 Although it is certainly impossible to avoid all these problems, some can be sidestepped. Since we aim to measure individual parties, we will refrain from using indicators for the aggregate system level. Second, in order to remain as close as possible to the four-dimensional concept, we will use as many indicators as necessary. As far as availability is concerned, the GIGA data (received from nine sub-Saharan countries) fill important gaps. As regards the choice of data type-subjective vs. objective, qualitative vs. quantitative-we will combine them. Combining them helps to exploit all their advantages and compensates for their weaknesses.
In correspondence with the four dimensions developed above, the Index of the Institutionalization of Parties (IIP) is composed of four subindices: roots in society, autonomy, organizational level, and coherence (see Table 2 ). We assign three to four indicators to each of the four dimensions (that is, 15 indicators in total). Depending on the validity of indicators and the availability of data, the indicators are based on either quantitative or qualitative data.
The values of the quantitative indicators, such as party age, electoral support, or party identification, are converted into a three-scale coding system from 0 to 2, while qualitative indicators such as links to civil society or nationwide presence are directly coded from 0 to 2 on the basis of field research. In every case the (converted) indicator value zero represents the lowest level of institutionalization and two the highest level. The identification with a party shows "popular appreciation" of the party as such, which is another important characteristic of autonomy. In order to capture this differentiation we use not only the percentage share of respondents in our survey who identify with the party in question but also the share of respondents intending to vote for the party who at the same time express high appreciation for it.
There is a multitude of options for measuring the level of organizational strength of political parties. Besides the difficulty of obtaining pertinent data, the main problem in this regard may relate to a less formalized understanding of party membership in African countries, which leads to a lack of formal counting of permanent members. The GIGA data may partly close the gap in both qualitative and quantitative terms. For the strength of membership, we use the results of our representative survey polls, which asked not only about membership but also about whether or not the respondents held a membership card. Whether or not party congresses are held regularly is a key indicator of the procedural aspect of the level of organization. Field research allows us to evaluate whether the party in question has held party congresses in accordance with party statutes-that is, as scheduled and without major irregularities in their conduct, particularly as regards intraparty elections. We visited party headquarters in the national capitals and interviewed party members and observers. Primarily, we assessed the level of maintenance of the headquarters; the presence of personnel; and the material resources such as computers, offices, and information material. In order to capture the organizational level outside the capital-an important issue in developing countries where party activities are often concentrated in the capitals and confined to campaigning periods-we also (personally) assessed the presence of the party in rural areas; 7 our assessment includes the level of activity during times when there were no electoral campaigns. A wellorganized (and hence institutionalized) political party should also be active in these periods.
The coherence of a political party requires that-notwithstanding its organizational differentiation-it can act as a unified organization. We have measured the level of coherence using three qualitative indicators: First, the prevalence of floor-crossing and/or defections from the parliamentary group during the legislative period. A strict and precise quantitative approach, however, proves difficult given the extreme volatility of events in some of the cases (Malawi, Benin, Mali), and we have therefore chosen to assess the relative share of defections and floor-crossing in more qualitative terms (distinguishing between three levels, see Moderate relations as opposed to splits and heavy infighting work best for coherence.
Empirical Findings from 28 African Parties
We have applied the IIP to altogether 28 African political parties in sub-Saharan Africa. We have selected the political parties from nine African countries which were included in the GIGA study. All these countries have held at least three multiparty elections since the (re)introduction of democratic procedures and have been listed as at least partly free by A number of African countries require that parties maintain offices throughout the country in order to avoid regionalist or ethnic parties. Although one might argue that this may be an undue advantage for parties in such countries, we have decided not to consider this feature. If measures of party regulation work and hence strengthen institutionalization, it should be acknowledged. 8 A complete list of these parties with their abbreviations and names is provided in Annex II. In the majority of cases, we abstain from giving their mostly pointless names in the main text. 9 Beninese electoral law allows individual parties to create common lists. Parliamentary seats are allocated to the list and not to individual parties, though they clearly continue to exist separately and do not show any at the country and dimensional levels and continue with the findings on cross-national groups of parties. The data analysis remains at a largely descriptive level at this stage since an in-depth analysis of causes and consequences of party institutionalization is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. However, the results of the detailed measurement by the IIP certainly show that party institutionalization in sub-Saharan is far from being uniform and that the questions regarding its causes and consequences may be more difficult to answer than is commonly assumed.
In terms of the national averages, individual countries range from 1.60 for Benin to 4.77 for
Tanzania on the zero-to-eight-point IIP scale (see Table 3 and Figure 1 ). Ghana, close to Tanzania, scores second, followed by Botswana. Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali come in fourth, fifth, and sixth respectively. Zambia and Malawi, with almost identical values, rank third last and second last respectively. Evidently, there is a broad potential for improvement in terms of average party institutionalization when we keep in mind that the best-performing country (Tanzania) gets only 60% of the possible peak value while Benin comes quite close to the bottom end.
By looking at country averages only, we might underestimate the differences between dimensions and single parties. Dimensional scales (zero to two points) can be divided into four levels. Values above 1.5 points indicate "high" institutionalization and scores below 0.5 points "poor" institutionalization, while values above 0.5 and 1.0 signify "limited" and "moderate" levels of institutionalization. Overall averages in all four dimensions are fairly low (see Figure 1 ). However, the spread of different values for individual countries is remarkably dissimilar. The limited level of "roots in society" is much more homogenous ambition to merge. Nevertheless, official results do not provide for individual party affiliations, but rather give the name of the list only. The Union pour le Bénin du futur (UBF) won the biggest seat share in the 2003 elections. FARD-Alafia and PSD have been the main parties of the alliance. We have integrated both into the sample, in addition to the next two parties in terms of seat shares (RB and PRD). This is how we guarantee that the assessment for Benin represents a total seat share above 66%, i.e., two-thirds of parliament. again, this is the case for one dimension, namely, coherence (see Table 4 ). The size of electoral constituencies can also be eliminated as an explanatory factor. Hypothetically, smaller constituencies could focus the interest of the electorate on individual candidates and therefore dilute the institutionalization of abstract organizations (Nohlen 2004: 137-141) . 10 This should be especially noticeable in the dimension of external value-infusion, that is, autonomy. However, three countries with classical first-past-the-post electoral systems lead in terms of autonomy values as well as in terms of the overall assessment (Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania), while a case using a PR system in small and medium-size constituencies ranks last in both respects (Benin). 11
The level of democratization, as outlined in the introduction, may also be related to the institutionalization score. Yet, no clear-cut pattern emerges: Although studies on the party system level find a positive correlation between institutionalization levels and democracy Lambright 2005, Basedau 2007 ) and a study on Anglophone countries also shows a nexus between democratization and the institutionalization of individual parties (Basedau et al. 2006 ), this is not the case when Francophone countries are included. Correlations are insignificant. This also holds true when controlling for different dimensions. The top-scoring country, Tanzania, is only partly free in terms of the Freedom House index, while the worst performer, Francophone Benin, is considered "free." In general, in Francophone countries, levels of democracy and institutionalization seem adversely related since the best-performing Francophone countries on the IIP are less democratic (Burkina Faso and Niger, both "partly free"). This may imply that party institutionalization follows a different logic in these two groups of countries. A more adequate conclusion is that the link between the institutionalization of parties and democratization is less clear-cut than conventional wisdom suggests.
The preliminary insight that national factors are less decisive than sometimes postulated backs our initial assumption that the lack of differentiation between individual parties and party systems-that is, first and foremost the national level-may cover up a significant heterogeneity among individual parties. The box plot in Figure 3 demonstrates the growing 10 However, there is no automatic link between strong personalism and poorly institutionalized parties (Ansell and Fish 1999) . But due to other deficits, personalism becomes a devaluating factor for political parties.
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There are no pure PR systems with one (main) nationwide constituency in the sample. When looking for top and worst performers at the dimensional level, a global trend that divides the sample into two becomes visible: those parties which appear in at least one dimension as a top performer (subindex > 1.5; 8 of 28 parties) and those parties that appear in at least one dimension as a worst performer (subindex < 0.5; 19 of 28 parties). Two almost mutually exclusive groupings emerge, with one exception: the Malian party ADEMA, which acts incoherently but is quite well-organized (see Table 5 ). Only three parties (CUF, CDS, and NDC) remain in the inconspicuous midfield. Hence, the instrument offers new opportunities for advanced cross-country comparative research since we should explain why some parties from different countries have more in common than the bulk of relevant parties acting in one national context. To pave a few meters of the road ahead, that is, to illustrate what service the IIP may render, we have tested some particularly apparent influencing factors.
The lengthy ruling period observed among top performers leads to the question of whether the duration in office, measured in years of government participation, is a good predictor for the IIP. If we consider all 28 parties, the statistical correlation is quite high and significant (Pearson's r = 0.64; F significance at the 1% level). Furthermore, the IIP clearly shows the relative advantage today of those parties that rely on former unitary power structures which did not collapse at the moment of system change. CCM, CDP, MCP, and MNSD all come out best among their countries' three main parties, and they are all former single parties or, as in the case of CDP, absorbed so-called revolutionary grassroots structures. 12 A correlation between the latest vote share in national parliamentary elections during the period under examination and the IIP is even higher (r = 0.73; significant at the 1% level).
Since the correlation does not tell us anything about causal direction, it seems reasonable to interpret this as a self-energizing effect. Access to office and posts in the government, including administration and the legislature, seems to be a beneficial condition for higher institutionalization. Access to resources is not the only factor, but there is evidence that it is an important one that should be further investigated. However, it cannot be seen as a sufficient condition if we consider those parties with very poor results. To give an example, there are two Beninese parties with an IIP of 1.0 only, which are largely controlled by two of the country's richest men, Adrien Houngbédji (PRD) and Bruno Amoussou (PSD). The two are most probably able to support a solid apparatus, but they each regard the particular party as their personal property-which is actually true because the parties' financing comes mostly from their private fortunes. PRD headquarters in Cotonou and Porto-Novo, for instance, are located in the private estates of the party president, without any party sign. At PSD headquarters personnel are not allowed to hand out basic information on the party (such as its program) without the president's consent. This leads manifestly to a lack of value-infusion vis-12 All other countries did not have single parties prior to (re)democratization (Botswana, Ghana), or their single parties collapsed immediately under the unstable conditions of changing orders (Benin, Mali). Only Zambia's UNIP survived, but it declined to a purely regional remnant and therefore did not become part of our sample.
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Basedau/Stroh: Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries à-vis the party as an abstract organization, which is reflected by a double zero in the dimensions of autonomy and coherence. 13 We have already conceded that an in-depth study of the causes (and consequences) of the degree of institutionalization is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we have aimed here to present how a new research instrument can be applied and to demonstrate its general usefulness. Although an index like the IIP may suggest mathematical precision-which, of course, would be a grave misinterpretation-it can provide a measurement of party institutionalization by helping to describe, systematically and empirically, what happens to and within parties in regions where they are estimated to be rather poorly institutionalized. And it should be noted that this is actually the case in the majority of countries which have multiparty systems in the world today. Hence, the IIP points to the road ahead by uncovering cross-country commonalities in terms of strengths and weaknesses in the different dimensions of institutionalization that should be explained.
Conclusions
The institutionalization of political parties and party systems is said to be key to democratic development, but its practical operationalization for measurement is underdeveloped in the pertinent literature. This is particularly true for the institutionalization of individual political parties, which we should clearly distinguish from party systems because of their different characteristics. This article may contribute to closing the gap which we have identified between the theoretical discussion and actual empirical measurement, since we dispose here of sound qualitative and quantitative data from two research projects at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs.
We understand the institutionalization of political organizations as a process of progress in four dimensions: roots in society, level of organization, autonomy, and coherence. In other words, institutionalization is the process of growing external and internal stability as well as Election data (see above) and GIGA country expertise -1 = >50% 0 = 50%-20% 1 = 10%-20% 2 = <10%
AUT. 3 Decisional autonomy The party is able to decide on programmatic and personnel matters largely independent from individuals ("Big Men"), cliques, and societal groups.
Qualitative assessment according to GIGA study 0 = party depends on Big Man or outside group 1 = partially dependent or opaque 2 = largely independent Autonomy Notwithstanding its societal roots, the party is relatively independent from individuals within and societal groups outside the party AUT. 4
Popular appreciation of particular party
Two indicators: percentage of respondents: 1. identifying with particular party 2. "liking" the party "very much" as percentage of those respondents intending to vote for the particular party GIGA surveys 1) 0 = <20% 1 = 20%-40% 2 = >40% 2) 0 = <60% 1 = 60%-80% 2 = >80% ORG. 1
Strength of membership
Share of respondents holding a membership card of the party in question as percentage of all respondents (context-sensitive interpretation)
GIGA surveys 0 = 1st tercile 1 = 2nd tercile 2 = 3rd tercile ORG. 2
Regular party congresses
Since the beginning of the multiparty era the party has held party congresses in accordance with party statutes. Congresses are held as scheduled and conducted regularly.
Quantitative/ qualitative assessment according to GIGA study 0 = sporadic or no party congresses 1 = considerable constraints on regularity (e.g., frequent and serious organizational problems) 2 = regularly held party congresses ORG. 3
Material and personal resources
The party has considerable material and personal resources such as employees, offices, and funds (assessment irrespective of state party-funding provisions).
Quantitative/ qualitative assessment according to GIGA study 0 = few material resources (few employees, offices, funds) 1 = some 2 = many
Level of Organization
There is an organizational apparatus which is constantly present at all administrative levels und acts in the interest of the party ORG. 4
Nationwide organizational presence, which extends election campaigns
The party's organizational presence includes nationwide offices, regular meetings of members, and public rallies. This presence and activity covers the whole national territory outside the capital and is not confined to times of elections campaigns (assessment irrespective of legal requirements for nationwide presence). Tolerance of intraparty dissidence
The party leadership tolerates partial deviations from the party line (i.e., no massive violations of principles such as basic values, role as opposition/government party, or statutes) without resorting to verbal intransigence, threats, or expulsion of dissidents Quantitative/ qualitative assessment according to GIGA study 0 = expulsion ("hounding out") 1 = verbal intransigence & threats by party leadership 2 = freedom of expression * If not marked otherwise the assessments cover the last completed election period and the period until the end of the year 2006.
Source: Authors' compilation.
